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JURISDICTION 
This Court granted certiorari on August 14, 2001. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2. 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issue is presented for review in the Appeal: 
Under Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127, is a mortgage executed by the manager of a limited 
liability company valid and binding on the limited liability company? 
The standard of review for this issue, which was decided in the affirmative on Motion to 
Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and affirmed on appeal 
by the Court of Appeals, is correctness and no deference is given to the decision of the trial court 
or the court of appeals. E ^ , Mounteer v. Utah Power & Lieht Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following portion of the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, codified at Utah Code 
Ann. §48-2b-127 of the Utah Code is determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage or disposition 
of property of the limited liability company shall be valid and binding upon the 
limited liability company if they are executed by one or more managers of a 
limited liability company having managers. 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 18, 1999, Plaintiffs sued Mt. Olympus and Jerez, asserting claims against Mt. 
Olympus for : (1) declaratory judgment, (2) negligence, and (3) partition. In response, Mt. 
Olympus filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Honorable Anne M. Stirba granted Mt. Olympus's 
motion, ruling that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127(2), the documents executed by Jerez 
were binding upon the LLC. Appellants appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed Judge 
Stirba's ruling on April 26, 2001. See Appendix "B." This appeal ensued. 
On August 20, 1994, Namvar Taghipour, Danesh Rahemi, and co-defendant Edgar Jerez 
(Jerez) formed Jerez, Taghipour and Associates, LLC (the LLC)1. The group formed the LLC to 
purchase and develop a parcel of real estate (the property) under a joint venture agreement. The 
LLC's Articles of Organization listed Jerez as a LLC member and manager. 
On August 31, 1994, the LLC acquired the Property. On January 10, 1997, three and one-
half years later, the LLC through its manager, Jerez, entered into a loan agreement for $25,000.00 
with Mt. Olympus. To secure the loan, the LLC through its manager, Jerez executed, and 
delivered a trust deed on the Property to Mt. Olympus. Subsequently, Mt. Olympus dispersed 
$20,000.00 of the funds to the LLC and applied the remaining $5,000.00 for various loan related 
fees. Jerez apparently misappropriated the $20,000.00. As the managing member Jerez owed 
fiduciary duties to the LLC. Jerez breached his fiduciary duties and failed to abide by the terms of 
his agreement with Appellants2. The LLC, ultimately defaulted on the loan and Mt. Olympus 
1
 See Appellants' Complaint, Appendix "A" 
2
 The Complaint alleges that the operating agreement provided that no loan could be 
contracted without the consent of all members of the LLC. 
2 
foreclosed on the Property. Appellants did not at any time offer to repay any portion of the loan 
to Mt. Olympus. 
Appellants misstate the allegations of their Complaint. Appellants state that Mt. 
Olympus, "did absolutely no due diligence of any kind," other than verifying that Jerez was the 
manager of the LLC3. 
Appellants also state that 
Only after the redemption period for the foreclosure sale had 
expired did the Appellants learn that the property had been 
mortgaged by Jerez to obtain the loan. (Emphasis added). 
This allegation reflects the wording from paragraph 23 of the Complaint except the 
portion underlined, "redemption period for the." The sale was a non-judicial trustee sale which 
has no redemption period let alone a redemption period "after" the sale. See Utah Code Ann. 
§57-1-21 et seq. Arguably, the three month period after the Notice of Default is recorded could 
be considered a redemption period of some kind. If that is what is meant by Appellants then they 
have added an admission that they had knowledge of the circumstances prior to the trustee sale4. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because it is the policy of law to encourage the alienability of property and the free flow 
of commerce the legislature has made provisions in Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127 for third parties 
to rely upon the representation of LLC's managers when dealing with property. There is no 
conflict between Utah Code Ann. §§48-2b-125 and 48-2-M27, the former defines the rights 
between management and members of the LLC and the latter between third parties and the LLC. 
3
 This is not supported by the Complaint, is irrelevant and is argument, not fact statement. 
4
 If that is not what was intended one must question why the words were added, 
3 
This is not simply a case of first impression but rather a case of only impression that will 
affect the rights of only these parties because the legislature has repealed the statutes in question. 
The cases cited by Appellants support Mt. Olympus's argument that when a manager acts within 
the apparent (in the case stated) and ordinary course of the LLC's business Mt. Olympus could 
rely upon the representations of the LLC's manager. Equity also requires that rather than Mt. 
Olympus suffering for the bad acts of the LLC's manager the partners of the manager should 
suffer because they created the circumstances that made the loss possible— they are the ones that 
clothed him in managerial authority, they are the ones that could have limited his authority, they 
are the ones that should have been monitoring his activities and their property. 
The creation of Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-802 rather than limiting the authority of the 
LLC's manager, clarifies and expands the manager's authority. Where the Articles of 
Organization, the public document giving constructive notice to person dealing with the LLC, 
does not limit the manager's authority, the manager may bind the LLC and the documents signed 
by the manager, in this case the note and trust deed, shall be "conclusive" in favor of the person, 
in this case Mt. Olympus, who gives value without knowledge of any lack of authority. No 
inquiry beyond the Articles of Organization was or is required. 
Whether under general principles of partnership law, Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127 or the 
new Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-802, Mt. Olympus had the right to rely upon Jerez as the publicly 
declared manager of the LLC. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
1 11 IE TRUST DEED OBTAINED BY MT OLYMPUS AND SIGNED B \ 
APPELLANTS' MANAGER IS VALID AND BINDING AS A MATTER OF LAW 
4ND APPELLANTS1 COMPIAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED 
A. UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §48-2b-127 MT. OLYMPUS COULD RELY 
ON JEREZ'S SIGNATURE AS THE MANAGER OF A LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY WITHOUT FURTHER INQUIRY. 
While pleading several causes of action against Mt. Olympus, Appellants' claims all 
boiled, down to one legal quest n HI i \\ litlhei iin* limuril linhilih company can escape 
responsibility for a mortgage executed by its manager. The Utah Legislature answered that 
question when it enacted the Utah Limited Liability Company Ac I, I ''tali < 'niL "\I,III f;4K-"1v I '"7 
specifically states in pai t: 
Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage or disposition 
of property of the limited liability company shall be valid and binding upon the 
limited liability company if they are executed by one or more managers of a 
limited liability company having managers, 
Significantly, this section of the statute, dealing WID. inc aliLiiat>;iu> :T. pj ^ ., K .1 
coma.. - 1.1: ^ui : ^ • -\* •-•• *MV\ uVd in the articles of organization or 
operating agreement" which limitation is the crux of Appellants' argument. That language is 
found 01 J 1\ m I a,, v oaw An::. ;•*> - .: m. ^ .. .. . '\ ^ ion 
commerce5. Certainly had the Legislature intended that limitation apply in the specific context 
.'uu^ ' «MIK- lii ins concurring opinion in this case suggests that this result was "not so 
much the product of carefully weighed policy considerations as it is the product of legislative 
oversight or lapse." However, Mt. Olympus avers that Utah Code Ann. §48-2b~127, the newly 
created Utah Code Ann, §4S~2c-8Q2, as well as similar statutory schemes such as Utah Code 
Ann. §48-1-6 are, exactly that, the products of careful legislative considerations that facilitate 
ornmeree and sustain and promote the longstanding public policy of the free alienability of 
5 
of mortgages, they would have incorporated similar language in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-1276. 
However, when the Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-125 in 1992 and again 
in 1996 it chose to leave that limiting language out of Utah Code Ann. §48~2b-127. The only 
logical conclusion, therefore, is that the Legislature, in the context of documents dealing with 
alienability of property, because of their importance to the free flow of commerce, opted for 
clarity and reliability of the instrument. 
Contrary to Appellants' argument, this reading of the statute does not create a conflict in 
the statutory scheme. Legislation often lays out the general case, then prescribes different rules 
in specific contexts. We even have a canon of statutory construction that recognizes this 
recurrent method of legislating. Where a specific statutory term applies, it takes precedence over 
a general pronouncement. Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co.. 974 P.2d 1194, 
1203 (Utah 1999). 
As applied to this statute, that canon of construction leads to the perfectly logical 
conclusion that when dealing with important transactions, vital to the economic health of the 
state, such as alienability of property, the Legislature wanted clarity and enforceability. It is not 
surprising that the Legislature should have made this specific direction in Utah Code Ann. §48-
2b-127 with regard to real estate transactions, while preserving a more structured approach 
regarding other transactions in Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-125. Alienability of property is regarded 
as an essential characteristic of a healthy and robust economy. It is the "policy of law...to keep 
6
 Appellants' reliance on the repeal of Utah Code Ami. §§48-2b-125 and 127 and the 
creation of Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-802 is misplaced. Under this new provision the mortgage 
obtained by Mt Olympus and signed by Jerez would have been binding and valid. The new 
statute clarifies and increases the authority of the manager unless expressly limited in the articles 
of organization-a public document giving constructive notice of the limitation. 
6 
• •. ' .••:: ;r encourage alienabilm Mf property rather than the contrary," Boyle v. Baggs 
^(i I',2d 622 at 625 (Utah 1960). See also i apital Assets Financial Servi.es v. Maxwell w - i d 
• • "• -
 ;
 '• -*)- K V \ . uauih: " *• •.f ?:r - •. J.kLiL^JA^Iil Associates v. Hercules, 
Inc. 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1990); Redd v. Western Sav. & Loan Co. 646 P.2d 761 • Utah 
1982); Neves v. Wright ().3<S IJ Jd I I V> (I Hall IPM I I! Inr. i nin IIISUMI IS liiillui 
Legi- -^i--.- again dealing with this issue and enacting Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-802 which stales 
in parti 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections (1) and (2), unless the articles 
of organization [the public document] expressly limit their authority.., any 
manager in a manager-managed company, may sign, acknowledge, and deliver 
an v document transferring or affecting the company's interest in real or personal 
^erty, and if the authority is not so limited, the document shall be conclusive in 
lav or of a person who gives value without knowledge of the lack of authority of 
the person who signs and delivers the document 
(Emphasis added ) 
In ' • * ' • • ! ... . - • iuun that does violence to the language employed by the 
Legislature. If Appellants' interpretation is adopted an instrument is not valid and binding on the 
limited i,aniii!\ /nmpa* * . . , '• • : -*'.1. r * • !• '*ms some 
unqualified "due diligence."7 As a matter of law, that is not required. 
7
 Under such a scheme the lender would never know that it had done enough oi that it 
wouiu not be hauled into court on every loan it makes to a limited liability company and the 
iihVnabilitv of nmnern would be stymied. 
7 
B. CONTRARY TO APPELLANTS' ASSERTION, MT OLYMPUS OWED 
NO DUTY TO APPELLANTS IN THIS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 
TRANSACTION. 
Central to each of the causes of action pleaded by Appellants is the allegation that Mt 
Olympus owed some duty to Appellants to verify that Jerez was not acting outside the scope of 
his authority set forth in the operating agreement. For instance, in the Third Claim for Relief,8 
captioned "Declaratory Judgment", Appellants alleged: 
The [Appellants] are entitled to declaratory judgment that the Olympus Loan and 
the accompanying mortgage of the Property and subsequent foreclosure were 
invalid because Olympus failed to determine that Jerez [the manager] did not have 
the power to take the actions that he did under the Articles and Operating 
Agreement of the L.C. 
Appendix "A" at f^ 37. In the Fourth Claim for Relief, captioned "Negligence", Appellants 
alleged that Mt Olympus owed Appellants a duty which was breached because "Olympus failed 
to verify whether or not the managing member could mortgage the corporate property to secure a 
debt." Appendix "A" at If 41. 
Mt Olympus' Motion to Dismiss was premised on the simple proposition that Mt 
Olympus had a statutory right to rely on the signature of Appellants' manager to make its 
mortgage valid. In this regard, the Legislature has spoken and unambiguously stated: 
Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage, or 
disposition of property of the limited liability company shall be valid and 
binding upon the limited liability company if they are executed by one or 
more managers of a limited liability company having a manager.... 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127(2). (Emphasis added.) 
8
 Mt Olympus was named only in the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Claims for Relief. 
8 
Under this statute, the only thing required for Jerez to enter the mortgage at issue is that 
he be the manager of the limited li.abi.lity company. Since the Complaint pleaded that they 
selected .lore/ as tin. niitinn'ei ninl In1 ^ as Atimy in thai rapanh Appendix "A" at^f 12, there can 
be no facts that deprive Mt Olympus of the statutory right to rely on his signature to take a 
mortgage on this property . . uC r , •_ »• )• ^ •<?. 
C UTAH CODE ANN. §48-2b- 125 DEFINES THE RIGHTS BETWEEN 
MAN AC;EMENT OF H I E LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND I rs 
MEMBERS. 
•^
 K
 - -;1 r r , \iiiu ui'dur K \*4 o u — M s v>h j t a h Code Ann. §48-2b-
125 which provides that any manager or managing member oi a limited, liability company "has 
authority to bii id the Hi i lited. liability coi i lpai IJ , i mless (v; r^ '•" i * • • *• ,• -
organization or operating agreement," I Jtah Code Ann, iJ4S-2h-! 25 Appellants position is 
simply wrong. That pro \ l^ u.r. avUJivsse.-. u^
 i;j.n:^ ^ n^^ ,:-. :u.:;.;•• • 
liability con lpany and its members. That provision likewise expressly allows the members to, 
among themselves, change or limit that authority in the articles of organization or liic operating 
agreemei it This allov • s n lembers of the Hi nited liability company to define who shall manage the 
company, and provides a member redress against any member or manager acting beyond their 
authority. 
The provision does not, however, alter the clear statutory language that any manager can 
bind the limited liunnity company. iu ( MuJtA!iL ( N j . _ .M, •. . u. ,;s 
( • ^  :_:iie.-1 by Appellants would place an onerous and nearly impossible burden on those 
contracting with a limited liability company because it would require that person to inspect and 
iv • i ._ *<;- - »:• :, - : n c n i s n o t a p u b l i c 
9 
record. Indeed, the logical source to obtain the operating agreement would be the individual 
representing the limited liability company in the transaction - the same individual whose 
authority is in question and who, if he doesn't have authority, has motive and additional 
opportunity to deceive. Under Appellants' argument, this may not even be enough. The lender, 
if provided with an operating agreement, would have no way to independently verify that it was 
authentic and valid. Thus, Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-125, in part, was an acknowledgment by the 
Legislature that it is more efficient and practical that members of limited liability companies 
police themselves rather than shift that burden to third parties. 
Appellants' contention that Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-125 necessarily limits and restricts 
section Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127, is contrary to the language of both sections and would 
frustrate the obvious purpose behind the clear wording of Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127 of the 
Utah Code. Thus, Judge Stirba correctly granted Mt Olympus' Motion to Dismiss and the Court 
of Appeals properly affirmed. 
II. WHERE JEREZ ACTED WITHIN THE LLC'S ORDINARY OR APPARENT 
SCOPE OF BUSINESS, WHERE THE ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION DID 
NOT LIMIT JEREZ'S AUTHORITY, WHERE UTAH CODE ANN. §48-2b-127 
GAVE MT. OLYMPUS REASON TO BELIEVE JEREZ HAD AUTHORITY AND 
WHERE MT. OLYMPUS RELIED ON THE APPEARANCE OF AUTHORITY 
AND CHANGED ITS POSITION, NO FURTHER INQUIRY WAS REQUIRED. 
Appellants argue that a lender in a commercial loan setting has a due diligence 
requirement to determine the authority of a manager to bind the limited liability company above 
that required by Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-1279. Appellants argue that this is a case of first 
Appellants state that this question is one of first impression in Utah and in the nation. 
However, with the repeal of Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127 it actually becomes a question of 
"only" impression because resolution will affect these parties and no one else. 
10 
in iHIi ,,-.I<III ,iiid I here fore the Court should look to cases involving corporate and partnership 
entities to determine the question in this instance involving limited liability companies. 
I he argui net Hi .Hid u I .Hums cmplnvi d Ih Appelliinls b",,>' Ihr (|iii'sli(»n flie cases cited do 
not establish that a lender has any legal due diligence requirement. A lender has no such duty. At 
most, Appellants use the cases to argue that one claiming to act on behalf of a corporatioi i : i a 
partnership must have authority. But nothing in the cases cited suggest that a lender must \ cnty 
that authority before loaning money where the public document i>: tin jniii > UUL-S :,*•; .:.;.-:• he 
.iiilhf *i 11 s, ^ here Ihr piihln document e\ piessh .mlhiM'i/ed the type of transaction and where a 
statute expressly authorizes reliance on the one executing the documents. One must distinguish 
between ;i.e icga; . jquiremenl ol due diligence ami Hie meie ^ isdoni iHMuc diligence. In tliL 
case, once Mt. O^nnus had reviewed the public Articles of Organization establishing Jerez's 
manager status r.i '-une n.eimrv was requii..u. 
A 4. CORPORATE RESOLUTION IS NOT 4.1 .WAYS NECESSARY 
BEFORE AN OFFICER OR AGENT OF I HE CORPORATION HAS 
Al ITHORITY TO BIND THE CORPORATION, 
A,';v :.i. - • •• *ev,ein 1 ;neigla^o\. ivlituii. .\»^ko:iK.- uiiu bli.-iinc.i, 789 P.2d 34 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) to argue that without a corporate resolution no officer or agent has 
authority to bind the corporate,; ,:; a :v.di . ^L IL JCUI. Western, lio\ve\ei. dull m ill addicss Hi.it 
issue but rather a different question of whether ^ nni a law fmn acling on behalf of a corporation 
can benefit from I Jtah's indemnification statute Utali L <><\c . urn. c! < , -< a; j . i age:.. . ; 
corporation. • • 
The Western Court analyzed not only Utah Code Ann, §16-1 0-4 but three other sections 
lining agoni •' - '<'••- <t * t•". 
ii 
personnel who exercise management discretion and who have authority to bind the corporation." 
Western at page 39. Western does not stand for the idea that one cannot bind a corporation in a 
real estate deal without a corporate resolution and certainly does not stand for the idea that a 
lender in a commercial transaction has a due diligence requirement to verify corporate authority. 
Rather, it stands for the idea that if one wants statutory protection when acting on behalf of 
corporations they must act with proper authority10. 
However, there is also authority in Utah that indicates that a corporate resolution is not 
always necessary before a corporation can be bound. In Peterson v. Holmgren Land & Livestook 
Co. 363 P.2d 786 (Utah 1961) the Court stated that in a family corporation where the articles of 
incorporation provided for the purchase of real property and the father/president entered a 
contract on behalf of the corporation, that he had ostensible (apparent) authority even where there 
were not sufficient corporate minutes authorizing him to act. The Peterson Court quoting 13 Am. 
Jur. Sec. 890 at page 871-872 said, 
If a corporate officer assuming to contract on behalf of the 
corporation is one to whom authority to make such a contract may 
be given, a person dealing with him in good faith in not affected by 
the fact that the proper steps to clothe him with such authority were 
not taken. 
Id. at page 788. See also Amoss v. Bennion 420 P.2d 47 at 49 (Utah 1966). 
The Western Court as dicta in a footnote does state that without board resolution no 
officer or agent has authority to bind the corporation in a real estate deal. In so doing Western 
cites Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 815, 818 (Utah 1975). Foster, also in dicta, states 
the same but was discussing the specific issue of a corporate secretary not ordinarily having the 
authority to bind a corporation where in that case the secretary had indicated the contract in 
question required the signature of the corporate president and had actually left space for the 
President to sign. 
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Ill miiis (Msr the Articles of Organization named Jerez as the manager and stated that the 
purpose of the LLC was to purchase and develop real property. Add « ;,h.,. w. ;i\;npus s 
reliance o;; L ian • . •. * ' ' ' i5 " • ' matter of a LLC can bind the LLC 
relative to property and Appellants' reliance on Western as authority that further due diligence 
was required of Mt. Olympus is mistaken. 
JEREZ ACTED WITHIN TlW, EXPRESS SCOPE OF THE LLC'S 
BUSINESS THEREFORE MT. OLYMPUS HAD NO FURTHER BURDEN 
TO ESTABLISH JEREZ'S AUTHORITY. 
*-• •
;> - . far as partnerships are concerned a lender must 
verify the actual . •;• apparent authority of the signing partner Appellants cite Luddington v. 
Bodenvest Lid. ,v s . i .-•» - - i v. ...*. L • •-• a ^:unir:- :. :- -nisnlaced. 
The portion of Luddington cited by Appellants also slant! foi the uka that one can rel\ apt-: 
partner who acts \\ nhh the scope of the partnership )L,.>..iw> . ; . » • . . :L. I.UUUIJIL.JW», V. .U-S 
Peterson v. Aini^uoni: " " ' .,f tah •'^'l* The Peterson Court stated: 
The law is well settled that a partner without special authority, has 
no power to bind the firm in any transaction which is without the 
ordinary or apparent scope of the partnership business. Of this the 
plaintiff was bound to take notice and, having entered into a 
transaction with one partner, which was not, as clearly appears 
from both the pleadings and proof, within such scope, and having 
brought this suit to establish liability on the part of the other 
partners, the burden was upon her to show either that the 
contracting partner had special authority, or that the transaction 
was afterwards ratified by the other partners who she seeks to hold 
liable". 
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 This concept, that a partner acts as an agent of the partnership and the act ofevery 
partner binds the pailnership including execution in the partnership name of any instrument for 
apparently carrying on — *V '--'.'a! wav the business of the partnership has been codified in Utah 
Code A nn. §4S-1 -fi 
In the present case, Jerez was obtaining a loan from Mt. Olympus for the exact and 
express purpose for which the LLC was organized, to "develop a parcel of real estate... located at 
3664 East 7650 South, Salt Lake City, Utah." See Appendix "A," paragraph 8 and 9, and 
Appendix "C," emphasis added. The stated purpose of this loan was clearly within the "ordinary 
or apparent scope of the partnership business." 
Even if partnership law were to apply, rather than the express language of Utah Code 
Ann. §48-2b-127, under Peterson as cited in Luddington, Mt. Olympus has no burden as to the 
partner's, in this case Jerez's, authority if the transaction was within the scope of the partnership. 
In this case Jerez acted completely within the scope of the LLC's business12. Luddington, 
Peterson, Utah Code Ann. §48-1-6, Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-127 and the new Utah Code Ann. 
§48-2c-802 all support Mt. Olympus. 
Notwithstanding the above, Luddington says much more and can be further distinguished. 
Most glaring, is that in Luddington the Certificate of Limited Partnership, a public document, 
expressly limited the authority of the general partner. See Luddington at page 209. In this case, 
the Articles of Organization, the LLC's public document, did not limit the authority of Jerez, the 
LLC's manager. 
12
 Not only did Jerez act within the scope of the LLC's business, Mt. Olympus did not 
bring suit to "establish liability on the part of the other partners," one of the burden shifting 
elements of Peterson and therefore the burden was not upon Mt. Olympus. 
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C. JEREZ HAD APP 4..RENT AUTHORITY TO BIND THE LLC WHERE 
THE ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION NAMED HIM AS THE LLC'S 
MANAGER, THE ARTICLES WERE A PUBLIC DOCUMENT, MT. 
OLYMPUS BELIEVED JEREZ HAD AUTHORITY, UTAH CODE ANN 
§48-2b-127 GAVE MT. OLYMPUS REASON TO BELIEVE JEREZ H \D 
AUTHORITY, AND MT. OLYMPUS IIAD (HANGED ITS POSITION IN 
REI ,1ANCE ON JEREZ'S AUTHORI1Y . 
L u d a i i m i o - . » i i ^ - . i .v .>*>. • < •* • • ' - ' • • - i v ' !^:* ' . - i / : ' :••J apparent authority. 1 he 
Court stated: 
In order to show apparen: jh:;:- . - ,r . i -:-e 
established: 
(1) that the principal has manifested his [or he: J conseni to ilv 
exercise of such authority or has knowingly permitted the agent to 
assume the exercise of such authority; (2) that the third person 
'»' of the facts and, acting in good faith, had reason to believe, 
: i
 • • <:Ur believe, that the agent possessed such authority; 
Jiird person, relying on such appearance o 
authority, has changed his [or her] position and will be injured or 
suffer loss if the act done or transaction executed by the agent does 
no' bind the principle. 
Luddington at page 209. 
In the present case the LLC manifested its consent to Jerez cxercismi: ; i-
( - — :ei to further the express objective of the LLC to develop 
property when it stated its purpose and named Jerez as its manager in the Arti.cl.es of 
Organization,;., • . * .^-, -^ *!• ' *i/iosui 
Organization are a public document. Mt. Olympus evidently believed that Jerez had authority 
because it executed the transaction anc ga\ c JCI^ -. , . - ; . » . -
Jerez had the authority because the law at the time of the transaction, Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-
127 states: 
1.5 
(2) Instruments and documents providing for the mortgage...of 
property of the limited liability company shall be valid and binding 
upon the limited liability company if they are executed by one or 
more managers... 
Lastly, Mt. Olympus, relying on the Articles of Organization and Utah Code Ann. §48-
2b-127 changed its position by issuing a loan to the LLC for $25,000.00. Mt. Olympus will be 
injured if the LLC is not bound by the acts of Jerez. 
D. EQUITY REQUIRES THAT IF THERE IS A CHOICE BETWEEN MT. 
OLYMPUS OR APPELLANTS AS TO WHO SHOULD SUFFER 
BECAUSE OF JEREZ'S ACTION IT SHOULD BE APPELLANTS 
BECAUSE THEY CREATED THE CIRCUMSTANCES MAKING THE 
LOSS POSSIBLE. 
Luddington states that the doctrine of apparent authority has its roots in equitable estoppel 
and that it is founded on the idea that where one of two persons must suffer from the wrong of a 
third the loss should fall on that one whose conduct created the circumstances which made the 
loss possible. See Luddington at page 209. 
This matter cries out for such an application. Jerez was the Appellants' choice as a joint 
venturer, a member of the LLC and the LLC's manager. The Appellants clothed him with 
managerial authority. The Appellants sat in a room with Jerez while both the Articles of 
Organization and the Operating Agreement were signed. They could have easily restricted his 
authority in the Articles, the public document, so that third parties, like Mt. Olympus, would be 
on notice of any restrictions. This they did not do and this is exactly what the new Utah Code 
Ann. §48-2c-802 requires.. The Appellants relied upon Jerez. The Appellants know to whom 
they must look for redress as they have alleged in their complaint that Jerez breached his 
fiduciary duties to Appellants and converted the loan proceeds to his own use and that he failed 
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to use reasonable and good judgment. Appellants failed to supervise Jerez or even watch their 
investment. They failed to see that a mortgage was recorded or the very public process of the 
foreclosure, hi short, they waited until Mt. Olympus would suffer the most before stepping 
forward to finally police their partner, Jerez. 
The burden of Jerez's bad character and bad acts must be borne by Appellants. This, of 
course, is especially true where Jerez was acting within the express scope of the LLC's business, 
the public document clothed him with managerial authority and the statutory scheme then and 
now sustain Mt. Olympus's reliance13. Applying the agency analysis of the cases cited, Jerez 
acted with apparent authority and Mt. Olympus had no further inquiry than that required by Utah 
Code Ann. §48-2b-127. 
III. UNDER THE NEW STATUTE UTAH CODE ANN. §48-2c-802 JUDGE STIRBA'S 
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
EQUALLY CORRECT. 
Appellants completely misstate Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-802. Appellants state that this 
section expressly limits the power of the manager "to only bind the company, even in real 
property situations, only if they are allowed to do so by the Articles of Incorporation." See the 
bottom of page '11 ' of Appellants' brief. This is absurd. 
The statute reads in relevant part: 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), in a manager managed company 
Luddington has at least one further distinguishing point. The general partner took the 
loan in Luddington for his own purposes unrelated to the business of the partnership. As the 
dissent stated, "imposing, defacto, an extraordinary high duty of inquiry on the Lender to police 
the internal operations of a partnership that had the misfortune of having" a manager such as 
Jerez, in this case, would be improper. 
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(a) each manager is an agent of the company for the purpose of its 
business; 
(b) a member is not an agent of the company for the purpose of its 
business solely by reason of being a member; 
(c) an act of a manger, including the signing of a document in the company 
name, for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the company 
business, or business of the kind carried on by the company, binds the 
company unless the manager had no authority to act for the company in the 
particular matter and the lack of authority was expressly described in the 
articles of organization or the person with whom the manager was dealing 
knew or otherwise had notice that the manager lack authority; and 
(d) an act of a manager which is not apparently for carrying on in the 
ordinary course of the company business, or business of the kind carried 
on by the company, binds the company only if the act was authorized by 
the members in accordance with Subsection 48-2c-803(2) or (3). 
(3) Notwithstanding the provision of Subsections (1) and (2), unless the articles of 
organization expressly limit their authority, any member in a member-managed 
company, or any manager in a manger managed company, may sign, 
acknowledge, and deliver any document transferring or affecting the company's 
interest in real or personal property, and if the authority is not so limited, the 
document shall be conclusive in favor of a person who gives value without 
knowledge of the lack of authority of the person who signs and delivers the 
document. 
This statute could not be any clearer. It does not further limit the power of managers, as 
argued by Appellants, it actually clarifies and expands the authority of managers. If the Articles 
of Organization, a public document giving constructive notice to all who deal with the LLC, does 
not expressly describe the lack of authority of a manager and the manager was apparently 
carrying on in the ordinary course of the business then the company is bound. Utah Code Ann. 
§48-2c-802(3) goes even further. "Unless the Articles of Organization expressly limit" the 
manger's authority, the manager can do exactly what Jerez did in this case. 
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Under this new statutory scheme Judge Stirba would have been equally correct in 
dismissing Appellants' complaint 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing, the Honorable Anne M. Striba's decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this J\7 day of November, 2001. 
ATKIN & HAWKINS, P.C. 
Gregory P. H&wieins 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Mt Olympus Financial, LC 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NAMVAR TAGHIPOUR, and DANESH 
RAHEMI, M.D., individuals and JEREZ, 
TAGHIPOUR AND ASSOCIATES, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EDGAR C JEREZ, an individual, and 
MOUNT OLYMPUS FINANCIAL, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
JURY DEMAND 
Civil No.: 990JJCJ%3 
Judge: #f/{?1 
Plaintiffs Namvar Taghipour, Danesh Rahemi, M.D., and Jerez, Taghipour and 
Associates* LX.C, complain of Defendants and for cause of action allege a$ follows: 
FACTS 
1. Namvar Taghipoxir ("Taghipouf 0 is and was at all times material hereto, a resident of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Dr. Danesh Rahemi ("Rahemi") is and was at all times material hereto, a resident of 
the State of Massachusetts. 
3. Edgar C. Jere& ("Jerez'*) is and was at all times material hereto, a resident of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Jerez, Taghipour and Associates, LLC, ("the LC") is a Utah limited liability company 
5. Mount Olympus Financial, L, C, ("Olympus'*) is a Utah limited liability company 
with its principal plaoe of business at 330 South 300 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 
8411L 
6. On August 30, 1994 Taghipour, Rahemi and Jerez formed the LC. 
7. The initial registered office of the LC was 10 Exchange Place, Suite 309, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
8. The purpose of the LC was to purchase and develop a parcel of real estate under a 
joint venture agreement. 
9. The parcel of land that the LC wished to purchase was located at 3664 East 7650 
South Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 ("the Property'5), 
10. Membership and contributions in and to the LC were divided among six individuals; 
Defendant Edgar C. Jerez, Plaintiffs Taghipour and Rahemi, Ksai Liang, Orlando Jerez 
and Dean Becker. 
1 h On August 31,1994 the owners of the Property conveyed the Property to the LC. 
12. The Articles of Organization of the LC listed Defendant Edgar Jerez as the manager 
oftheLC. 
13. According to Section 3.4 of the Operating Agreement no loans were allowed to be 
contracted on behalf of the LC without a resolution by the members. 
14. The Operating Agreement prescribes that formal actions by members require a 51% 
majority of the ownership interest 
15. The Operating Agreement further provides that voting in the LC will to be in 
accordance with the percentage of the member's equity ownership interest. 
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16. On January 10,1997 without obtaining approval as required under the Operating 
Agreement and without the knowledge or consent of the LC, Jerez unilaterally entered 
into a loan agreement with Olympus ('the Olympus Loan**) wherefcy he gave Olympus a 
Deed of Trust to the Property to secure a Trust Deed Note for $25,000.00. 
17. Olympus disbursed to Jerez only $20^000 of the $25,000 Olympus Loan keeping 
$5,000 as an origination fee., points or some other financing inducement. 
18. Jerez defaulted on the Olympus Loan. 
19. The other LC members never received any notices of default or of the pending 
foreclosure sale. 
20. Plaintiffs continued to make payments on the promissory note to the underlying 
landowners of the Property. 
21. Olympus foreclosed on the Property. 
22. Even after the Olympus foreclosure the Plaintiffs made a payment on the Property. 
23. Only after the foreclosure sale did the Plaintiffs learn that the Property had been 
mortgaged by Jerez to obtain the Olympus Loan. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Against Jerez: Accounting/Constructive Trust) 
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 1 through 23. 
24. Under the Operating Agreement of the LC Jerez agreed to account to Plaintiffs for all 
monies collected and disbursed by him for the LC. 
25. Jerez has collected at least $25,000 allegedly on behalf of the LC 
26. An accounting is necessary to show the amount due to Plaintiffs from Jerez. 
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27. A constructive trust should be placed on all assets of Jerez to recover to the Plaintiffs 
all of the monies shown by the accounting to have been improperly dealt with by Jerez. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Against Jerez: Breach of Fiduciary Duties) 
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 1 through 23. 
28. As the managing member Jerez owed fiduciary duties to the LC. 
29. Under the Articles of Organization and the Operating Agreement of the LC Jerez, as 
the managing member, could not enter into a loan transaction unless agreed to by the 
other members. 
30. Jerez breached his fiduciary duties to the LC by entering into the Olympus Loan 
without obtaining proper approvals and then converting the proceeds to his own personal 
use. 
31. Jerez further breached his fiducuiary duty by failing to give the Plaintiffs notice of his 
actions so that they may cure the default. 
3Z Jerez did not use reasonable care or good business judgement 
33. As a direct and proximate result of Jerez' actions and inactions Plaintiffs have 
sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial consisting of the following: loss 
of the Property, money paid out to the underlying landowners, and interest that would 
otherwise have accrued on Plaintiffs' accounts. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Against Olympus: Declaratory Judgment) 
Plainttfis reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations 
contained in Paragraphs 1 through 23. 
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34. Rights, dirties and obligations as members of a limited liability company are created 
and limited under Utah law by the company's Articles of Organization and its Operating 
Agreement 
35. A dispute now exists between the Pkintiffe and Olympus as to the Olympus Loan and 
foreclosure of the Property. 
36. This action for declaratory judgment is brought under Section 78-33-1, et seq, Utah 
Code Annotated 
37. The Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory judgment that the Olympus Loan and the 
accompanying mortgage of the Property and subsequent foreclosure were invalid because 
Olympus failed to determine that Jerez did uot have the power to take the actions that he 
did under the Article and Operating Agreement of the LC 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Against Olympus: Negligence) 
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 1 through 23. 
38. Olympus owed a duty of which the Plaintiffs were beneficiaries to determine if Jerez 
had the authority to execute the Olympus Loan. 
39. The standard of care in the financing industry requires such due diligence in part for 
the benefit of innocent third-parties such as the Plaintiffs. 
40. Olympus breached this duty and standard of care by failing to obtain verification of 
the propriety of Jerez's entry into the Olympus Loan. 
4 L Olympus failed to verify whether or not the managing member could mortgage the 
corporate property to secure a debt. 
42. On information and belief Olympus never inspected the Operating Agreement or 
other documentation of the LC to determine whether Jerez had the authority to mortgage 
the Property, 
43. Olympus* reliance was not reasonable and breached its standard of care. 
44. The standard of care would have required Olympus to have had written 
documentation that Jerez had appropriate authority to execute the Olympus Loan and 
mortgage the Property. 
45. Olympus knew, or should have known that managing members of limited liability 
companies do not always have the authority to unilaterally obtain loans and/or mortgage 
company property. 
46. The Olympus Loan violated Olympus's standard of care and duties to the Plaintiffs 
and the LC. 
47. As a direct and proximaie result of Olympus1 actions the Plaintiffs have sustained 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial consisting of the following: loss of the 
Property, money paid out to the underlying landowners, and interest that would otherwise 
have accrued on Plaintiffe5 accounts. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Against Olympus: Fartition) 
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations 
contained in Paragraphs l through 23. 
48. Pursuant to Chapter 39 of Title 7X, U.C.A.. the Plaintiffs are entitled to a partition of 
the various interests in the Property viv a vis Olympus. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Dissolution of L Q 
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Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations 
contained in Paragraphs 1 through 23. 
49- Pursuant to Section 48-2b-142(l)(a), (b) and (c), U.C.A., the Plaintiffe are entitled to 
dissolution of the L.C and to an accounting and setdement of the assets of the L.C. 
pursuant to Section 48-2b-138, U.CA. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Quiet Title) 
Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations 
contained in Paragraphs 1 through 23 
50* Plaintiffs are entftled to have the title to die Property quieted in them as against 
Olympus* 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request: 
1. Judgment against Jerez on the First Claim for Relief for an accounting to Plaintiffs for 
all money and property received on behalf of the LC by Jerez and the imposition of a 
constructive trust on all such wrongfully appropriated monies; 
2. Judgment against Jerez on the Second Claim for Relief for damages in an amount to 
be determined at trial; 
3. Judgment on the Third Claim for Relief declaring that the Trust Deed and Trust Deed 
Note in favor of Olympus are void, and that Olympus has no interest in the Property as a 
result of the foreclosure sale. 
4. A declaration on the Third Claim for Relief that the Plaintiffs are the owners and 
holders of the undivided interests in the Pproperty. 
5. Judgment on the Fourth Claim for relief for damages against Olympus in an amount 
to be determined at trial. 
6. On their Sixth Claim for Relief for partition of the Property. 
7. On the Sixtli Claim for Relief the Plaintiffs pray for a dissolution of die L.C. and for 
an accounting and settlement of the assets of the LX. pursuant to Section 48-2b-138, 
ULC.A. 
8. On the Seventh Claim for relief for an order quieting title to the Property in the 
Plaintiffs. 
9. Any other relief that this Court considers proper. 
JURYDEMAJfl) 
The Plaintiffs request that issues triable before a jury be so heard, 
DATED this / j l day of June, 1999. 
B A I R D ^ j r a i ^ a J ^ . ^ ^ 
Bmc^^Baird 
Att&aeys for the Plaintiffs 
Addresses of the Plaintife: 
Nam! Taghiponr 
4830 South Arbor Cr. 
Holladay,UT841I7 
Dr. Danesh Rahimi 
60 Tanglewood Road 
Newton, MA 02159 
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL 
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Namvar TAGHIPOUR and Danesh Rahemi, 
M.D., individuals; and 
Jerez, Taghipour, and Associates, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
Edgar C. JEREZ, an individual; and Mount 
Olympus Financial, 
L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
Defendants 
and Appellees. 
No. 20000047-CA. 
April 26, 2001. 
Two members of limited-liability company (LLC) 
and the LLC brought action against third member 
and lender, seeking declaration that loan agreement 
entered into by lender and third member was invalid, 
claiming damages for lender's negligence, and 
seeking partition of LLC property that secured loan. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
Anne M. Stirba, J., granted lender's motion to 
dismiss. Two members and LLC appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Thome, J., held that: (1) third 
member, as manager, had right to bind LLC to loan 
agreement without vote by all members, and (2) 
lender took all steps necessary to determine that 
third member was manager. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., concurred and filed opinion. 
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reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness. Rules 
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It is the power and responsibility of the legislature 
to enact laws to promote the public health, safety, 
morals, and general welfare of society, and the 
Court of Appeals will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the legislature with respect to what best 
serves the public interest. 
[8] Corporations <®^425(5) 
101 — 
101X1 Corporate Powers and Liabilities 
101X1(B) Representation of Corporation by 
Officers and Agents 
101k425 Estoppel to Deny Authority or Acts in 
General 
101k425(5) Estoppel of Corporation by Acts or 
Declarations. 
Lender took the steps necessary to determine that 
borrower was manager of limited-liability company 
(LLC), such that LLC was bound by loan 
agreement, although LLC's operating agreement 
provided that no loan could be contracted on behalf 
of the LLC without resolution approved by its 
members, where lender correctly concluded that 
borrower was manager, and lender was not required 
by Limited Liability Act to inquire further about 
operating agreement. U.C.A. 1953 § 48-2b-127(2). 
[9] Appeal and Error <®=>169 
30 — 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court 
of Grounds of Review 
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court 
30kl69 Necessity of Presentation in General. 
As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial 
court may not be raised on appeal. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department. 
The Honorable Anne M. Striba. 
Bruce R. Baird and Dean H. Becker, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellants. 
Blake S. Atkin and Jonathan Hawkins, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
**1 % 1 Plaintiffs Namvar Taghipour, Danesh 
Rahemi, M.D., and Jerez, Taghipour and 
Associates, LLC, appeal from an order dismissing 
their claims against defendant Mt. Olympus 
Financial, L.C. (Mt.Olympus). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
K 2 On August 30, 1994, Taghipour, Rahemi, and 
co-defendant Edgar Jerez (Jerez) formed Jerez, 
Taghipour and Associates, LLC (the LLC). The 
group formed the LLC to purchase and develop a 
parcel of real estate (the Property) under a joint 
venture agreement. The LLC's Articles of 
Organization listed Jerez as a LLC member and a 
manager, while its Operating Agreement provided 
that no loan could be contracted on behalf of the 
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LLC without a resolution approved by its members 
U 3 On August 31, 1994, the LLC acquired the 
Property On January 10, 1997, Jerez, unbeknownst 
to the LLC's other members or managers, 
unilaterally entered into a loan agreement for 
$25,000 with Mt Olympus on behalf of the LLC 
To secure the loan, Jerez executed and delivered a 
trust deed on the Property to Mt Olympus 
Subsequently, Mt Olympus dispersed $20,000 of 
the funds to Jerez and kept the remaining $5,000 for 
various fees Jerez apparently misappropriated the 
$20,000 The LLC, unaware of the loan, ultimately 
defaulted on it and Mt Olympus foreclosed on the 
Property 
11 4 On June 18, 1999, plaintiffs sued Mt Olympus 
and Jerez, asserting claims against Mt Olympus for 
(1) declaratory judgment, (2) negligence, and (3) 
partition In response, Mt Olympus filed a motion 
to dismiss The trial court granted Mt Olympus's 
motion, ruling that pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 
48-2b-127(2) (1998), the documents executed by 
Jerez were bmdmg upon the LLC Plaintiffs timely 
appealed 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] H 5 "The propriety of a dismissal based on Utah 
R Civ P 12(b)(6) is a question of law, therefore 
we review the [trial] court's ruling for correctness " 
Stokes v Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94,H 6, 987 P 2d 
602 
[2] H 6 Plaintiffs argue the trial court's 
interpretation of section 48-2b-127(2) was in error, 
because a manager cannot unilaterally bind a limited 
liability company when the company's operatmg 
agreement or articles of organization require a 
majority vote or a resolution before undertaking such 
an act We review questions of statutory 
interpretation for correctness, according no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions See 
Adkins v Uncle Bart's, Inc , 2000 UT 14,1) 11, 1 
P 3d 528 
[3] \ 1 Plaintiffs next argue the trial court erred by 
ruling, as a matter of law, that Mt Olympus had 
taken the steps necessary to determme Jerez was a 
LLC manager We review a trial court's rulings of 
law for correctness See Munford v Lee Servicing 
Co , 2000 UT App 108,H 10, 999 P 2d 23 
H 8 Finally, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by 
dismissing their partition claim against Mt 
Olympus This also presents a question of law, 
which we review for correctness See id. 
ANALYSIS 
A Statutory Interpretation of Utah Code Ann § 
48-2b-127 
**2 % 9 Plaintiffs argue the Mt Olympus loan 
agreement, unilaterally executed by Jerez on behalf 
of the LLC, is invalid because the LLC's Operating 
Agreement requires membership approval before 
such an undertaking Plaintiffs assert that section 
48-2b-127(2), a Utah Limited Liability Act 
provision, requires such a result 
[4] [5] U 10 The rules of statutory construction 
require that we look "first to the plain language of a 
statute and assumef ] that each term was used 
advisedly by the [Legislature ' Biddle v 
Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,H 14, 993 
P 2d 875 Further, "it is well settled that a more 
specific [statutory] provision always takes 
precedence over a more general [statutory] 
provision " State v Hinson, 966 P 2d 273, 277 
(Utah Ct App 1998), see also Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 830 P 2d 233, 235 (Utah 1992) 
[6] K 11 In the present matter, plaintiffs argue that 
Utah Code Ann § 48-2b-125(2)(b) (1998) and Utah 
Code Ann § 48-2b-127(2) (1998) should be read in 
harmony, and therefore, section 48-2b-125(2)(b)'s 
restrictions on manager authority should be 
incorporated into section 48-2b-127(2) In pertinent 
part, section 48-2b-125(2)(b) states "If the 
management of the limited liability company is 
vested m a manager or managers, any manager has 
authority to bind the limited liability company, 
unless otherwise provided in the articles of 
organization or operating agreement " Utah Code 
Ann § 48-2b-125(2)(b) (1998) (emphasis added) In 
contrast, section 48-2b-127(2) states "Instruments 
and documents providmg for the acquisition, 
mortgage, or disposition of property of the limited 
liability company shall be valid and bindmg upon the 
limited liability company if they are executed by one 
or more managers " Id § 48-2b-127(2) 
H 12 The plain language of section 48-2b-127(2) 
provides no limitations on a manager's authority to 
execute specified instruments and documents, and 
thus, bind the limited liability company Further, 
assuming, as we must, that "each term [m section 
48-2b-127(2) ] was used advisedly by the 
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[Legislature," Biddle, 993 P 2d 875, 1999 UT 110 
at T| 14, we find no reason to suggest that had the 
Legislature intended section 48-2b-127(2) to include 
the same restrictions set rorth in section 
48-2b-125(2)(b), the Legislature would ha\e omitted 
those restrictions 
U 13 Additionally, plaintiffs' argument ignores the 
well-established rule of construction that specific 
statutory provisions prevail over general statutory 
provisions See Hinson, 966 P 2d at 277 Section 
48-2b-127(2) states, m no uncertain terms, 
"[instruments and documents shall be valid and 
binding upon the limited liability company if they are 
executed by one or more managers " Utah Code 
Ann § 48-2b-127(2) (1998) (^emphasis added) 
Accordingly, the specific requirements of section 
48-2b-127(2) must control over the general 
application of section 48-2b-125(2)(b)'s restrictions 
**3 [7] T| 14 Finally, we acknowledge plaintiffs' 
concern that 'the documents listed in [section] 
48-2b-127 have the greatest potential for damage to a 
limited liability company because they are 
encumbering the property of the limited liability 
company " However, "[i]t is the power and 
responsibility of the [Legislature to enact laws to 
promote the public health, safety, morals, and 
general welfare of society and [we] will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the [Legislature 
with respect to what best serves the public mterest " 
Bastion v King, 661 P 2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983), see 
also Redwood Gym v Salt Lake County Comm'n, 
624 P 2d 1138, 1141 (Utah 1981) (stating that "it is 
not the function of [appellate] court[s] to evaluate the 
wisdom or practical necessity of legislative 
enactments"), State v Mason, 94 Utah 501, 509, 78 
P 2d 920, 923 (1938) (statmg that the judiciary 
"cannot supplant [the Legislature s] judgment" with 
its own) 
% 15 Furthermore, we can conceive of several 
reasons why the Legislature might choose not to 
expand the protections for stockholders of a limited 
liability company in transactions lmolvmg the 
mortgage of real property These reasons may 
include the need to facilitate transactions involving 
the transfer of title to property and mortgages from 
the ongmal parties to new parties, and the limited 
access these new parties have to orgamc documents 
not revealed in a title search 
H 16 It is not necessary for our purpose, however, 
that we identify a specific basis for the Legislature's 
decision Rather, all that is required is that we 
acknowledge the Legislature's right to exercise its 
judgment It is not for us to evaluate, as plaintiffs 
would have us do, the wisdom of the Legislature's 
choice m light of alternative courses of action 
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's 
interpretation of section 48-2b-127(2) 
B Requirements of Utah Code Ann § 
48-2b-127(2) 
[8] T| 17 Plaintiffs next argue the trial court erred 
b> ruling, as a matter of law, that Mt Olympus had 
taken the steps uecessary to determme Jerez was a 
LLC manager Plaintiffs contend the loan 
agreement was "invalid because [Mt ] Olympus 
failed to determine that Jerez did not have the 
power to take the actions he did under the [LLC's] 
Articles [of Organization] and Operating Agreement 
Mt Olympus, however, correctly concluded that 
Jerez was a manager of the LLC, and section 
48 2b-127(2) requires nothing more Accordingly, 
the trial court correctly determined that Mt 
Olympus took the steps necessary to determme Jerez 
was a manager of the LLC, and therefore, satisfied 
the requirements of section 48-2b-127(2) 
C Partition 
[9] K 18 Fmaliy, plaintiffs argue the trial court 
erred by dismissing their claim for partition After 
reviewing the trial memoranda of both parties, the 
trial court found section 48-2b-127(2) dispositive and 
dismissed plaintiffs' claims (FN1) Following 
dismissal, the record in this matter lacks an objection 
or any other attempt by plaintiffs to obtain a specific 
ruling on their partition claim "As a general rule, 
claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal " State v Holgate, 2000 UT 74,^ 
11, 10 P 3d 346 In addition, we note that plaintiffs' 
failure to establish that Jerez lacked the authority to 
bind the LLC also results in the failure of their 
partition claim We therefore decline to reach the 
merits of plaintiff :>' partition claim 
**4. % 19 The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed 
1 20 I CONCUR Judith M Billings, Judge 
ORME, Judge (c oncurnng) 
% 21 I concur in the court's opinion In so doing, I 
must note that I find the policy reflected m sections 
48-2b-125(2)(b) and -127(2) to be quite curious If, 
as in this case, there are restrictions in a limited 
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liability company's organic documents on its 
managers* ability to unilaterally bind the company, 
those restrictions will be effecme across the range 
of mundane and comparatively insignificant 
contracts purportedly entered into by the company, 
but the restrictions will be ineffective m the case of 
the company's most important contracts Thus, if 
the articles of organization or operating agreement 
provide that the managers will enter into no contract 
without the approval of the company's members, as 
memorialized in an appropriate resolution, the 
company can escape an unauthorized contract tor 
janitorial services, coffee supplies, or photocopying, 
but is stuck with the sale of its property for less than 
fair value or a loan on unfavorable terms 
U 22 Surely this is at odds with the expectations of 
the business community A manager or officer 
typically can bind the compam to comparatively 
unimportant contracts, but, as is prouded in the 
Operating Agreement m this case, needs member or 
board approval to borrow against company assets 
Financial institutions know this and are able to 
protect themselves by insisting on seeing articles of 
incorporation, bylaws, and board resolutions-or the 
limited liability company equivalents~as part of the 
mortgage loan process A cursory review of such 
documents m this case would have disclosed that 
Jerez lacked the authority to bind the company to the 
proposed loan agreement 
H 23 In short, I suspect that the strange result in 
this case is not so much the product of carefully 
weighed policy considerations as it is the product of 
a legislative oversight or lapse of some kind That 
being said, I readily agree that the language of both 
statutory sections is clear and unambiguous and that 
it is not the prerogative of the courts to rewrite 
legislation If the laws which dictate the result m 
this case need to be fixed, the repairs must come via 
legislative amendment rather than judicial 
pronouncement 
(FN1 ) The trial court ruled that "[t]he [Mt 
Olympus loan] documents executed by Mr Jerez 
are valid and binding on the [LLC] " 
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VIT OLYMPUS FINANCIAL, LC 
33Q SOUTH 300 EAST SI HTE 100 SA1T LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111. 801-596-8(180. FAX 801.322-1800 
urpose of Loan: Business. 
.Family/Household Name of Business ^ ^ T ^ /aff*Jz4cX/Jt £ /£* 
planation of P u r a o s e : " ^ ^ ^ ^ jC^S?^ / t ^ k * ^ &/ < 4 a s t e * * ^ s^C^d^L 
ed for Bankruptcy^ 
.Filed When?_ ^Dismissed When?, 
mount of Judgments and who they arc owed to 
>;rower 
?rrower;_ 
fs» 
SS# 
Dme Phone: QfV? / ) <?tf\ - ^ ^ Work Phone: C&0() ?<T? ~ OH-C/lL-
operty Address: &£ Q~$ ^,££?&e><>TQ^ L V Fed or State Tax Liens:. 
Other Lien$-S.£*€ys&t K^{!L.( 
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st 
nd Mortgage Bai:, 
rd Mortgage Bal:: 
;:/7T;roQ' 
Mortgage Bal:_ £tC®Q Loan #. 
. Referred fry- ^ ^ ^ C j f l ^ ^ 
e 
Loan #_ 
"Loan # , 
Phone #: 
Co. Phone #._ 
Co. Phone #:. 
alue of Prop rty? 0?&0 ,r?Q O Tax Value: J^^ts &an &o 
~y Y~ 
jC<>mparables:„ 
AVe the undersigned hereby authorize Mt Olympus Financial, LC it's successors and/or assigns, to obtain any and all 
nformation necessary pertaining to.the closing of this loan, including, but not limited to a Credit Report The Borrowers 
jgree that if this loan is canceled by Borrowers for any reason, ALL costs and fees associated with the loan process must be 
said by Borrowers before the Trust Deed will be reconveyed, including but not limited to, Broker fees, origination fees, 
appraisal fees, title fees, processing fees, attorney's fees, etc. as shown on the closing statement. If Mt Olympus Financial, LC 
zancels the loan because of untrue information or misrepresentations provided by Borrowers, Borrowers will be responsible 
for costs and f^s as stated above. If Mt Olympus Financial, LC cancels for any other reason, Borrowers will not be 
responsible for costs or fees. 
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